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JAROD R. STEWART* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”) sets forth the conditions under which a court may grant a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas relief is granted when the 
proceedings leading to conviction “resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”1 A state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court 
precedent if it: (1) unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the 
facts of a particular case; or (2) extends a legal rule to a situation 
where it should not apply or fails to extend a rule to a situation where 
it should apply.2 
In the consolidated cases of Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and 
Brewer v. Quarterman, both petitioners were sentenced to death 
under Texas’s then-applicable statutory special issue instructions, 
which asked the jury to determine (1) whether the defendant’s 
conduct was committed deliberately, and (2) whether there was a 
probability that the defendant would commit future violent acts. 
 
 * 2008 J.D., Duke University School of Law. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996) (emphasis added). 
 2. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). 
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Under this statutory regime, if the jury answered both issues in the 
affirmative, the judge was required to impose the death penalty. In 
1989, the Supreme Court held that Texas’s special issue instructions 
were insufficient to give full effect to a defendant’s mitigating 
evidence of mental retardation and a history of severe childhood 
abuse.3 Drawing on that decision, both Abdul-Kabir and Brewer filed 
applications for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Abdul-Kabir and Brewer argued that 
the special issue instructions did not permit jurors to give full effect to 
the mitigating qualities of their abused childhoods and mental 
impairment.4 By a vote of 5-4, the Court agreed with Abdul-Kabir’s 
and Brewer’s arguments and therefore granted relief.5 The Supreme 
Court held that their applications for a writ of habeas corpus should 
have been granted because the Texas state court decisions denying 
Abdul-Kabir and Brewer post-conviction relief were “contrary to” 
and “involved unreasonable application[s] of clearly established 
federal law.”6 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Abdul-Kabir 
Jalil Abdul-Kabir, formerly known as Ted Calvin Cole,7 was 
convicted of capital murder in 1987 for strangling Raymond 
Richardson.8 At his sentencing hearing, prosecutors introduced 
aggravating evidence, including several prior convictions and expert 
testimony that described Cole as a sociopath who showed no promise 
of learning from his experiences.9 Cole presented two categories of 
mitigating evidence: (1) testimony from family members describing 
his unhappy childhood; and (2) expert testimony discussing the 
consequences of his childhood.10 The State discouraged jurors from 
 
 3. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989). 
 4. Brief of Petitioner at 13, Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007) (No. 05-
11284) [hereinafter Abdul-Kabir’s brief]; Brief of Petitioner at 9, Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. 
Ct. 1706 (2007) (No. 05-11287) [hereinafter Brewer’s brief]. 
 5. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1659 (2007). 
 6. Id.; Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1710 (2007). 
 7. This commentary will refer to the petitioner as Cole, and will only use “Abdul-Kabir” 
when referring to the Supreme Court’s actual opinion. 
 8. Cole v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 494, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 9. Abdul-Kabir’s brief, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
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taking this evidence into account when determining the special issues, 
and asserted that each juror had a duty to objectively answer the 
issues based on the facts rather than on their own views about what 
sentence would be appropriate for Cole.11 The jury answered both 
special issues in the affirmative and Cole was sentenced to death.12 
After his sentence was affirmed on appeal, Cole’s application for 
post-conviction relief was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals.13 Shortly thereafter, he sought habeas corpus relief in federal 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the special issues 
constrained the jury from giving full effect to his mitigating evidence.14 
The district court dismissed Cole’s petition because, under the Fifth 
Circuit’s “screening test,”15 there was no nexus between his 
mental/emotional condition and the murder.16 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Cole’s application for a 
certificate of appealability.17 Shortly thereafter, in Tennard v. Dretke,18 
the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “screening test” 
established by Davis v. Scott,19 and vacated and remanded Cole’s case 
for further proceedings consistent with Tennard.20 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit granted Cole a certificate of 
appealability, but affirmed the district court’s denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus.21 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Texas 
special issue instructions allowed the jury to consider and give full 
effect to Cole’s mitigating evidence.22 
B. Brewer 
Brent Ray Brewer was sentenced to death for a murder he 
committed while perpetrating a robbery. At his sentencing hearing, 
Brewer presented testimony that he was abused by his father, had 
used drugs, and had suffered from depression.23 As in Cole’s case, the 
 
 11. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1661. 
 12. Cole, 418 F.3d at 497. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460–61 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 16. Cole, 418 F.3d at 497. 
 17. Id. at 498. 
 18. 542 U.S. 274 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 287. 
 20. Id. at 289. 
 21. Cole, 418 F.3d at 496. 
 22. Id. at 511. 
 23. Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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prosecutor discouraged jurors from exercising their own moral 
judgment in determining Brewer’s sentence, and directed them to 
answer the questions based solely on the evidence presented at trial.24 
Brewer proposed several jury instructions designed to give effect to 
the mitigating evidence he had presented, but the trial judge rejected 
all of Brewer’s suggested instructions.25 The jury was then instructed 
to answer the two Texas special issue instructions, which they did in 
the affirmative.26 
Brewer’s application for post-conviction relief was denied by the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.27 Like Cole, Brewer sought habeas 
corpus relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the 
special issues instruction constrained the jury from giving full effect to 
his mitigating evidence.28 The district court granted the writ of habeas 
corpus,29 but the Fifth Circuit reversed.30 The Court of Appeals 
distinguished Brewer’s evidence from that presented in Penry I, on 
the ground that Brewer’s mental illness was neither permanent nor 
severe.31 According to the Fifth Circuit, violations of Penry I involving 
mental illness evidence have only occurred where the illness is 
“chronic and/or immutable.”32 
III.  THE COURT’S OPINIONS 
In the consolidated cases of Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and 
Brewer v. Quarterman, the majority held 5-4 that the decisions of the 
Texas state courts denying post-conviction relief to Cole and Brewer 
were both “contrary to” and “involved . . . unreasonable application[s] 
of clearly established Federal law.”33 The lynchpin of this holding is 
the existence of clearly established Supreme Court precedent about 
mitigating evidence in capital sentencing cases. Justice Stevens wrote 
the majority opinion in both cases. Much of Justice Stevens’s opinion 
in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman is devoted to reviewing the Court’s 
death penalty jurisprudence to illustrate the “clearly established law” 
 
 24. Brewer’s brief, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1710–11 (2007). 
 27. Ex parte Brewer, 50 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. Crim App. 2001). 
 28. Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712. 
 29. Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 281. 
 32. Id. at 280. 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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that the Texas state court failed to rely upon when denying relief to 
both petitioners.34 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence was anything but clearly 
established in 1999, and thus the state court’s decisions can neither be 
labeled as contrary to, nor as unreasonable applications of, clearly 
established federal law.35 
A. Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinions 
 1. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman 
In Abdul-Kabir, Justice Stevens concluded that “well before” 
Penry I, the Court’s precedents had firmly established that sentencing 
juries must be able to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence.36 
According to the majority, a trio of cases began to lay the groundwork 
for this well-established principle—Woodson v. North Carolina,37 
Proffitt v. Florida,38 and Jurek v. Texas.39 In Woodson, the Court 
invalidated a capital punishment statute because it did not permit 
jurors to consider the defendant’s character and background before 
imposing the death penalty.40 The Court upheld Florida’s and Texas’s 
death penalty statutes in Proffitt41 and Jurek42 because they admitted 
without restriction all mitigating evidence. Justice Stevens, however, 
noted that a majority of the Court subsequently recognized that the 
holding in Jurek did not preclude finding that Texas’s death penalty 
statute was unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant.”43 
Continuing his review, Justice Stevens pointed to Chief Justice 
Burger’s plurality opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, which stated that the 
sentencer cannot be precluded from considering any mitigating 
evidence as a basis for giving the defendant less than the death 
sentence.44 The Court subsequently approved and broadened this 
plurality rule in Eddings v. Oklahoma, when the majority concluded 
 
 34. See discussion infra, Part A. 
 35. See discussion infra, Part B. 
 36. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007). 
 37. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 38. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 39. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 40. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion). 
 41. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257–58. 
 42. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, J.J.). 
 43. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1665 (referencing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988)). 
 44. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original). 
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that jurors in capital cases must be allowed to consider any relevant 
mitigating evidence.45 
Justice O’Connor further cemented the principles announced in 
Lockett and Eddings in her concurrence to Franklin v. Lynaugh,46 in 
which it was first recognized that a juror must be able to not only 
consider, but also to give effect to mitigating evidence. Justice 
O’Connor emphasized that a jury’s ability to consider and weigh 
mitigating evidence would be meaningless without the power to give 
effect to that evidence during sentencing.47 When mitigating evidence 
is relevant to one of the special issues, a juror can give such evidence 
full effect in considering the death penalty, but when a defendant’s 
mitigating evidence is not relevant to the special issues, a juror would 
have no vehicle for considering such evidence.48 
According to the majority, Penry I was both the most important 
decision in this area of the law and the decision that governed the 
facts of Cole’s case.49 Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that the 
decision in Penry I did not create a new rule of law, but was dictated 
by Lockett and Eddings, and used this as evidence of the existence of 
“clearly established law.”50 In Penry I, the Court incorporated the 
teachings of Lockett and Eddings, as well as Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Franklin, and held that Texas’s statutory special issue 
instructions were insufficient to permit jurors to give full effect to 
Penry’s mitigating evidence.51 At trial, although Penry presented 
evidence that he was mentally retarded and severely abused as a 
child, the jury answered the special issues in the affirmative and the 
judge sentenced him to death.52 
The Supreme Court concluded that Penry’s mental retardation 
was relevant to the first special issue, whether the defendant acted 
deliberately, but that it was also relevant to “his moral culpability 
beyond the scope of the special verdict question.”53 With respect to 
the second special issue, future dangerousness, the Court found that 
the jury could not give full effect to Penry’s mitigating evidence 
 
 45. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982). 
 46. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988). 
 47. Id. at 185 (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1668 (2007). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 323 (1989). 
 52. Id. at 309–10. 
 53. Id. at 322. 
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because his mental retardation was labeled as an aggravating factor 
that indicated a possibility of future dangerousness.54 Thus, Texas’s 
special issues allowed jurors to give full effect only to mitigating 
evidence that was offered to disprove deliberateness or future 
dangerousness, and did not tell jurors how to give effect to mitigating 
evidence that went beyond these two special issues.55 The majority in 
Abdul-Kabir essentially concluded that Penry I illustrates the clearly 
established law on this issue, as evidenced by the line of cases 
addressing mitigating evidence in death penalty cases both before and 
after Penry I.56 
In Cole’s case, the majority concluded that the trial judge’s 
recommendation to the Court of Criminal Appeals that it should deny 
post-conviction relief ignored Penry I, the most relevant precedent in 
this area of jurisprudence.57 The trial judge had instead relied upon 
three Texas state court decisions, as well as Graham v. Collins,58 to 
deny relief.59 In Graham, the Supreme Court concluded that under 
Texas’s special issues, the jury was able to sufficiently consider several 
categories of mitigating evidence, including a troubled childhood and 
abuse.60 Justice Stevens, however, concluded that the trial judge’s 
reliance on Graham was misguided because the holding in Graham 
was narrow and therefore not applicable to Cole’s case.61 The Court in 
Graham denied collateral relief not because it held that mitigating 
evidence of a troubled childhood and abuse is always sufficiently 
considered under Texas’s special issues, but because granting relief 
would have required announcing a new rule of constitutional law, in 
contravention of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).62 According to 
Justice Stevens, the narrowness of the holding in Graham is also 
illustrated by Johnson v. Texas, in which the Court rejected the very 
rule Graham sought—a rule that mitigating evidence of a troubled 
 
 54. Id. at 324. 
 55. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1670. 
 56. Id. at 1671–74 
 57. Id. at 1671–72. 
 58. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). 
 59. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1670. 
 60. Graham, 506 U.S. at 474. 
 61. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1671. 
 62. Graham, 506 U.S. at 477; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (prohibiting 
courts from applying a new rule of constitutional law to cases on collateral review unless the 
new rule falls within one of two narrow exceptions). 
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childhood and abuse is always sufficiently considered under Texas’s 
special issues.63 
As further evidence that the principles of Penry I are a reflection 
of clearly established law, the majority also pointed to three decisions 
subsequent to Penry I that explained that a jury must be able to fully 
consider and give meaningful effect to all mitigating evidence before 
imposing a death sentence: Penry v. Johnson,64 Tennard v. Dretke,65 and 
Smith v. Texas.66 
Thus, because Penry I represented clearly established federal law, 
the majority reversed the lower courts, concluding that the Texas 
court’s decision to deny Cole relief was an unreasonable application 
of Penry I.67 Although Cole’s evidence may not have been as 
persuasive as Penry’s (it was arguably different in kind, as well as in 
degree), the Court found that it “did not rebut either deliberateness 
or future dangerousness but was intended to provide the jury with an 
entirely different reason for not imposing a death sentence.”68 Thus, 
according to the majority, the decision to deny Cole relief flatly 
ignored the Court’s established principle that a juror must be able to 
consider and give full effect to all mitigating evidence before 
imposing the death penalty. 
 2. Brewer v. Quarterman 
In a much shorter opinion, Justice Stevens relied upon his 
exposition from Abdul-Kabir on what constitutes “clearly established 
law,” to conclude that the decision denying Brewer relief should 
likewise be reversed.69 The Court did not see a constitutionally 
relevant distinction between Penry I and Brewer in terms of the 
evidence presented concerning mental illness. Although Brewer’s 
mitigating evidence was not as persuasive as Penry’s, this was not a 
sufficient distinction for the Supreme Court.70 The lower courts had 
denied relief because Brewer was not diagnosed with a long-term 
mental illness, like Penry was, but was instead merely briefly 
 
 63. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 365–68 (1993). 
 64. Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
 65. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). 
 66. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (per curiam). 
 67. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1671 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 1672. 
 69. Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1709–10 (2007). 
 70. Id. at 1712. 
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hospitalized during a bout with depression.71 The majority concluded 
that this difference in degree did not justify the result because jurors 
could reasonably find—independent of the special issues—that 
Brewer did not deserve to be put to death.72 
According to the majority, Brewer’s mitigating evidence served as 
a double-edged sword because although it lessened his culpability, it 
also confirmed that he would likely pose a danger in the future.73 Thus, 
the jury was not able to give a reasoned moral response to Brewer’s 
mitigating evidence because it incriminated his conduct at the same 
time as it mitigated his culpability. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the 
district court’s grant of habeas relief, failed to heed the Supreme 
Court’s repeated warnings that a jury must be allowed to give full 
effect to mitigating evidence in deciding whether a death sentence 
applies.74 
B. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and 
Alito, Chief Justice Roberts blasted the majority by asserting that in 
1999 (when the state courts denied petitioners relief) there was no 
“clearly established law” on point, “but instead a dog’s breakfast of 
divided, conflicting and ever-changing analyses.”75 The Chief Justice 
began by stating that in the years before petitioners’ state habeas 
claims were heard, the Supreme Court had considered similar 
challenges to Texas’s special issue instructions at least five times.76 In 
four out of five cases, the Court rejected defendants’ claims that the 
special issues were insufficient vehicles by which to consider 
mitigating evidence.77 The only case of the five to grant relief was 
Penry I, a decision that, in Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the Abdul-
Kabir and Brewer majority selected from the mix and anointed as the 
one case representing “clearly established federal law.”78 
The dissent took issue with what it deemed as essentially a re-
writing of history in the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence.79 The 
 
 71. Brewer v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 273, 279–82 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 72. Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712–13. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1714. 
 75. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1676 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1681–84. 
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Court’s 1993 decision in Graham, which clarified the relationship 
between Jurek, Franklin and Penry I, supports Chief Justice Roberts’s 
position: 
It seems to us, however, that reading Penry as petitioner urges—
and thereby holding that a defendant is entitled to special 
instructions whenever he can offer mitigating evidence that has 
some arguable relevance beyond the special issues—would be to 
require in all cases that a fourth ‘special issue’ be put to the jury: 
‘Does any mitigating evidence before you, whether or not relevant 
to the above [three] questions, lead you to believe that the death 
penalty should not be imposed?’ The Franklin plurality rejected 
precisely this contention, finding it irreconcilable with the Court’s 
holding in Jurek, and we affirm that conclusion today.80 
The Chief Justice argued that the position rejected in Graham is 
the very position endorsed by the majority in Abdul-Kabir.81 Chief 
Justice Roberts responded to Justice Stevens’s assertion that Graham 
and Johnson did not disturb the basic legal principle at issue by 
questioning how this can be so when Justice Stevens himself, claiming 
that the majority was no longer being faithful to Penry I, dissented in 
both of these decisions.82 
In Chief Justice Roberts’s view, these two post-Penry I dissenting 
opinions are further evidence that the law was not “clearly 
established” in 1999.83 Merely four years after Penry I, Justices Stevens 
and Souter (members of the Penry I majority) dissented in Graham v. 
Collins on the grounds that Penry I was the applicable controlling 
precedent.84 Later that same year, in Johnson v. Texas, Justices Stevens 
and Souter again dissented from the decision denying habeas relief, 
and decried what they saw as the majority’s failure to follow and to 
apply the precedent of Penry I.85 Chief Justice Roberts saw this as 
strong evidence that Penry I was not clearly established law in 1999, 
and argued that the state courts adjudicating Cole’s and Brewer’s 
claims would have seen “an ongoing debate over the meaning and 
significance of Penry I.”86 The dissent also took issue with, according 
 
 80. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476–77 (1993) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 
2320, 2331 n.10 (1988)) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 81. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1680. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Graham, 506 U.S. at 506–07 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 385–86 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 86. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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to Chief Justice Roberts, the majority’s use of post-Penry I decisions 
as an indicator of Penry I’s status as “clearly established law” in 1999.87 
That case law is irrelevant, because under AEDPA the “clearly 
established law” must be established at the time of the state court’s 
decision.88 In a strong jab to the majority, Chief Justice Roberts 
asserted that “AEDPA requires state courts to reasonably apply 
clearly established federal law. It does not require them to have a 
crystal ball.”89 
According to Chief Justice Roberts, when the state courts 
adjudicated Cole’s petition for post-conviction relief, no clear 
precedent applied to the exact type of mitigating evidence Cole 
presented at trial.90 This evidence, including a troubled childhood and 
impulse control disorder, fell somewhere in between the type of 
evidence presented by the defendants in Graham and Johnson (youth 
and a transient upbringing) on the one hand, and the defendant in 
Penry I (mental retardation and severe abuse) on the other.91 Because 
there is a wide-ranging spectrum of mitigating evidence, and the effect 
that the jury is able to give to such evidence is a highly fact-centered 
determination, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude 
that Cole’s evidence was more like that presented in Graham and 
Johnson than that in Penry I.92 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that 
this type of deferential review of state court decisions is exactly what 
AEDPA intended for habeas cases.93 
IV.  IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
The substantive impact of the Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and 
Brewer v. Quarterman decisions will be of limited duration, as the 
Texas special issue instructions involved in these two cases have not 
been used since 1991. The sharp divide between the majority and the 
dissent, however, over what is “clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court” may have long-term implications 
for future AEDPA cases. 
 
 87. Id. at 1682. 
 88. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 
 89. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 1681. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1682. 
 93. Id. at 1681 (citing Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)). 
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There is a dearth of guidance from the Supreme Court as to what 
is “clearly established federal law,” for purposes of AEDPA. The 
Court first addressed this question in Williams v. Taylor, in which a 
majority of the Court agreed that it referred to the existing Supreme 
Court holdings, as opposed to dicta, as of the date of the relevant state 
court decision.94 In practice, however, this general description 
provides little guidance to the lower federal courts. Justice Stevens, in 
a plurality opinion to Williams, went further than the majority when 
he explained that clearly established law may be a standard, rather 
than a bright-line rule, meaning that a general rule requiring a case-
by-case application will suffice.95 This principle was illustrated in 
Justice Stevens’s separate majority opinion applying AEDPA to the 
state court adjudication, in which he stated that Williams’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel was “squarely governed” by 
Strickland v. Washington.96 Although Strickland was a standard to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, according to Justice Stevens, that did 
not make its rule any less clear or established than a more bright-line 
rule from the Court.97 
Since Williams, most lower federal courts cite to the majority 
language from Williams that “clearly established law,” for AEDPA 
purposes, refers to the Supreme Court’s holdings. There is, however, 
wide divergence among the lower courts about (1) whether a 
Supreme Court decision applies to the habeas petitioner’s factual 
situation, and (2) the level of clarity of the existing precedent. 
Lockyer v. Andrade98 provided the Court with another opportunity 
to offer more guidance on what is “clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” There, the 
petitioner was convicted under California’s “three strikes” recidivist 
statute, and sentenced to two consecutive life terms; his third 
qualifying conviction was for shoplifting $153 worth of videotapes.99 
On appeal, Andrade argued that his sentence was grossly 
disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.100 Supreme Court precedent had 
 
 94. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 
 95. Id. at 382. 
 96. Id. at 390. 
 97. Id. at 391. 
 98. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 99. Id. at 66–68. 
 100. Id. at 68–69. 
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addressed the disproportionality issue in only three cases: Rummel v. 
Estelle,101 Solem v. Helm,102 and Harmelin v. Michigan.103 The Court 
acknowledged that these precedents were not “a model of clarity,” but 
nonetheless found that “one governing legal principle emerge[d] as 
‘clearly established’” from this “thicket of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence”: that a gross disproportionality principle applies to all 
sentences for a term of years.104 Although the “precise contours” of 
disproportionality in sentencing were unclear and there was confusion 
about the existing trio of cases, the gross disproportionality principle 
was sufficiently broad to afford the state legislature significant 
discretion in determining appropriate sentences. The Court held that 
the state court’s decision upholding Andrade’s sentence was not 
objectively unreasonable because it was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of the gross disproportionality principle, 
which was “clearly established law.”105  
For purposes of what is “clearly established law,” the approach 
from Justice Stevens’s Williams plurality won the day in Abdul-Kabir 
and Brewer. In these consolidated cases, the Court was confronted 
with a set of opinions that were not a model of clarity on the issue of 
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing. There is logical force 
behind Justice Stevens’s argument that the principle underlying Penry 
I was, and had been, clearly established, despite the lack of clarity in 
its exact contours. The effect that a jury can give to mitigating 
evidence appears to be based on a generalized standard, applied on a 
case-by-case basis, which depends on the particular evidence 
presented by any given petitioner. The approach taken by Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissent holds water as well, because Cole’s and 
Brewer’s state court adjudications were not objectively unreasonable; 
these courts merely saw an ongoing debate within the Supreme Court 
on the effect that jurors must be able to give mitigating evidence in 
capital sentencing. Yet following Chief Justice Roberts’s approach, 
because the AEDPA so mandates, would have required the Court to 
uphold what turned out to be an unconstitutional state court 
adjudication. 
 
 101. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 102. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 103. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 104. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 
 105. Id. at 76–77. 
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The likely future impact of the standard for “clearly established 
law” emerging from these cases is that AEDPA will not constrain the 
Supreme Court from making a decision that the majority views as 
both correct and based in some existing precedent. AEDPA was 
intended to streamline habeas review and to prevent the creation of 
federal precedent upon which habeas petitioners could rely.106 The 
majority in Abdul-Kabir and in Brewer, however, likely saw the 
constitutional violations inherent in petitioners’ trials and used the 
approach from Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Williams (as well 
as that of the Andrade majority) to find clearly established law even 
though the precedents had not been a model of clarity. 
In future habeas cases, federal courts can take guidance from 
these decisions and not be so constrained in upholding what may be 
unconstitutional state-court rulings merely because AEDPA intended 
to “freeze” the law and streamline habeas review. Where defense 
attorneys can find and elucidate a governing legal principle that 
“emerges from the thicket” in a particular area of the law, they should 
be able to cite to Abdul-Kabir and Brewer and argue that their 
clients’ situations present “clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court.” In attempting to obtain habeas 
relief, such defense attorneys will have a majority of the Court behind 
them supporting their argument that the applicable law rises to the 
level of clarity required by the Supreme Court. The Government will 
be forced to paint the applicable legal principles as a mess, and to 
attempt to distinguish Abdul-Kabir and Brewer. In circumstances in 
which a governing legal principle is clear, the federal court can rely on 
that principle as “clearly established law” to find that a prior 
adjudication was either in accordance with or in violation of that 
governing principle. As a result of the decisions in Abdul-Kabir and 
Brewer, federal courts should have more discretion in conducting 
habeas corpus review. 
 
 
 106. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3.2 (5th ed. 2005) (quoting Statement of the President of the United States upon 
signing the Antiterrorism Bill, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996)); see also 
Browning v. U.S., 241 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that “AEDPA was intended to 
streamline the habeas application process, and our role as gatekeeper is a limited one. 
Analyzing the Court's body of jurisprudence with regard to each new rule of constitutional law 
would be inconsistent with this limited role and could lead to unnecessarily varied results among 
the circuits.”). 
